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Fundamental Structures in Georg Simmel’s Philosophy of Money
One of the lessons to be learned from Hegel’s philosophy is that there is a coherent struc-
ture uniting the entire cultural field.* According to the great metaphysician, philosophy 
does not stand above the other areas of culture, reflecting upon them from a position of 
transcendence, but rather develops in tandem with politics, religion, and art. Together, 
these four dimensions enact the unfolding of Spirit in history, that is, the movement in 
which substance becomes subject, or—to put it theologically—the movement in which 
God becomes fully himself.
It is not my intention here to defend the Hegelian metaphysics of Spirit. The idea 
that there is a certain coherence to the dimensions of culture makes sense independent-
ly of Hegel’s highly speculative metaphysics. Anyone studying the development of human 
civilization notices that the philosophy, politics, religion, and art of a particular epoch re-
flect each other. As an example, one could cite Erwin Panofsky’s book, Gothic Architec-
ture and Scholasticism, in which the eminent art historian suggests that the architecture 
of the Gothic cathedrals mirrors the construction of the summae in which the theologi-
cal thought of high scholasticism found its expression.1 Such parallelism between thought 
and art—and here, in particular, architecture—is by no means a phenomenon limited to 
the high Middle Ages. Postmodern architecture perfectly reflects the quest of postmod-
ern philosophy to articulate a coherent whole without thereby affirming the totalizing sys-
tems of modernity.2 And there are many other examples. Thus, it is not a coincidence that 
Kant’s transcendental idealism arose at the dawn of the Industrial Revolution. Industrial-
ization is nothing but the reflection, in the practical and economic realm, of Kant’s theo-
ry according to which we cannot encounter reality as it exists in itself, but only insofar as 
* Revised version of a paper presented at the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México on November 24, 
2017. For the invitation, I would like to express my warmest thanks to Professor Carlos McCadden, head of the 
Departamento Académico de Estudios Generales.
1 Erwin Panofsky, Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism, Wimmer Lecture, 1948 (Latrobe, Pa.: Archabbey 
Press, 1951). Panofsky was not the first scholar to suggest this parallel; for historical perspective on the parallel-
ism thesis, one may read Joseph C. Murphy, “Nervous Tracery: Modern Analogies between Gothic Architec-
ture and Scholasticism,” Concentric: Literary and Cultural Studies 33:1 (March 2007): 75–85.
2 I have commented on this parallelism in my essay, “Penser l’Autre: De l’architectonique d’un système qui ne 
serait pas homogénéisant,” Revue philosophique de Louvain 94 (1996): 311–29.
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it is an object of experience structured by the parameters of human thought. Anyone who 
drives around a highly developed city or sits in front of a computer surfing the Internet en-
counters a reality that is thoroughly shaped by human structures. In a Heideggerian vein, 
one might say that we no longer encounter trees, but only material for lumber or furniture; 
we no longer see rivers and lakes, but wastewater canals and reservoirs; indeed, much of the 
time we no longer interact with human beings, but with service providers and consumers. 
In this kind of environment—one could suggest—to uphold some type of “realism” is sim-
ply to hold fast to a relic from a bygone age.
Now to dispel a possible misunderstanding, I do not mean to defend a reduction of 
mind to matter. My point is not to maintain that Kant devised transcendental idealism be-
cause his philosophy was determined by the urban structures of life in late eighteenth-cen-
tury Königsberg. Such a theory of material substructure and intellectual superstructure 
fails to account for the causality that intellectual life exerts upon the material conditions 
in which it is rooted. (Put more simply, ideas have effects.) The point is, rather, to suggest a 
co-constitutionality of the various dimensions of culture, which influence and interpene-
trate each other. Thus, philosophy reflects (and reflects upon) life, which reflects philosophy.
In the quaternity of cultural forms that Hegel posits, the element of economics is 
missing. Marx was to make up for this omission, viewing as he did human history as the un-
folding not of Spirit, but of economic forces. If Marx’s reductionism does not make sense, 
assigning economics a crucial place among the pillars of civilization does. It is against this 
philosophical background that this essay considers the philosophy of money.
I. A Philosophy of Money?
To connect philosophy with money must, at first, appear counterintuitive. In fact, philoso-
phy has a long tradition of defining itself in opposition to money. In the Republic, the ruth-
less and anti-philosophical Thrasymachus wants Socrates to pay a fine should the latter lose 
their argument over the nature of justice. To which the prototype of the philosopher re-
plies: “I will as soon as I have some money” (Book I, 337d). Truth-seeking and money are 
here presented as being incompatible.
The reality is, however, more complex, even in ancient Greece. Scholars of antiquity 
have noted the appearance of currency in the Greek cities at the time of the establishment of 
democracy and the rise of the first sages, such as Solon and the Presocratics. They have sug-
gested that monetization represented an important element in the transition from a highly 
centralized, theocratic society to the classical polis, in which citizens exchanged arguments in 
the agora over the best course of political action. Just as politics became a matter of offering 
an account (logos) of one’s views in the public arena, so currency spread wealth through the 
polis while providing an objective measurement of economic values.3 If it is correct that mon-
ey and the quest for logos are not opposed but different sides of the same coin, so to speak—
3 For this argument, see Édouard Will, “De l’aspect éthique de l’origine grecque de la monnaie,” Revue his-
torique 212 (1954): 209–31, which Jean-Pierre Vernant summarizes in The Origins of Greek Thought (Ithaca, 
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1982), 94–95.
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the coin being a society in which law, truth, and value are subject to public examination—
then it becomes possible to imagine philosophy as being intrinsically concerned with money.
It is precisely this idea, that philosophy and money belong together, which lies at 
the heart of Georg Simmel’s Philosophy of Money. First published in 1900, Die Philoso-
phie des Geldes appeared in a slightly enlarged edition in 1907, just eleven years before its 
author’s untimely death in 1918, at the age of sixty. In this work, philosophy flows togeth-
er with economic theory, cultural history, psychology, and sociology to form a densely ar-
gued and rather austere book. The original German text consists of almost 600 pages with 
few quotations and no footnotes, and only the most rudimentary chapter divisions. Sim-
mel’s learned German makes few concessions to the reader.
The Philosophy of Money represents a synthesis of Simmel’s thought,4 having been 
prepared in a long series of essays that appeared in the years preceding the chef-d’oeuvre—
essays such as “The Psychology of Money” (1889) and especially various pieces that were 
published between 1897 and 1899 as “Fragments from a ‘Philosophy of Money.’” Simmel 
was a master of the philosophical essay, and some of his books are in fact essay collections. 
The thought of the Philosophy of Money is so complex, the project so ambitious, that its au-
thor may have struggled to hold the whole together.
Sadly, anti-Semitic sentiments in German academe long prevented Simmel from re-
ceiving the professional recognition he deserved. Marginalized, he turned to a less academ-
ic form of philosophy, one that found expression precisely in essays for a wider audience. 
This, in turn, further harmed his chances of professional advancement. Thus, it was only in 
1914, toward the end of his career, that he was appointed to a paid, full-time professorship 
at the University of Strasbourg (in the “provinces,” not in his native Berlin, which had been 
the center of his intellectual life).
Due to Simmel’s relative academic rootlessness, there was never a “school” of his stu-
dents. His thought was influential, but its reception remained piecemeal: scholars drew on 
individual aspects of his vast oeuvre, which ranged from work on Kant, Schopenhauer, and 
Nietzsche to books on Goethe and Rembrandt—not to mention his publications on so-
ciology, which were instrumental to the foundation of that discipline. But there were few 
attempts to appreciate Simmel’s philosophy as a whole, including the Philosophy of Mon-
ey. This observation applies all the more to scholars outside of Germany, since the Philoso-
phy of Money took a long time to become available in other languages. After Leo Belmont 
rendered it into Polish in 1904,5 more than seventy years elapsed before translations into 
other languages emerged. The book was first translated into Spanish in 1977 (by the well-
known political scientist Ramón García Cotarelo).6 The first English translation appeared 
4 In a letter to Heinrich Rickert, Simmel wrote in 1904: “I have lost interest … in all that I have written prior 
to The Philosophy of Money. This one is really my book, the others appear to me colorless and seem as if they 
could have been written by anyone else” (quoted in David Frisby’s preface to the second edition of The Philos-
ophy of Money, p. xlvii in the volume cited in note 7).
5 Georg Simmel, Filozofia pieniądza, trans. Leo Belmont (Warsaw: K. Kowalewskiego, 1904).
6 Georg Simmel, Filosofía del dinero, trans. Ramón García Cotarelo (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políti-
cos, 1977). 
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in 1978,7 followed by versions in Italian8 and French.9 This wave of translations is both 
the expression of, and has fueled, new interest in Simmel’s analyses of the role of money in 
structuring human life.
II. Money and the Structure of Being
To say that, according to Simmel, there is a strong connection between philosophy and 
money is an understatement. The most radical thesis of the Philosophy of Money goes far 
beyond such a claim:
This is the philosophical significance of money: that, within the practical world, it is the most 
definite visibility, the clearest embodiment of the formula of all being, according to which 
things receive their meaning through each other and the reciprocity of the relations in which 
they find themselves constitutes their being and their being-such.10
The German is even stronger than this translation in emphasizing the paradigmat-
ic role of money for the comprehension of the structure of reality; for Simmel claims that 
money gives the formula of all being its deutlichste Wirklichkeit, its clearest “effective reali-
ty” (wirken means “to have an effect”).
In order to understand this passage, we will have to answer two questions:
1. What is Simmel’s conception of money?
2. What, according to Simmel, is the “formula of all being”?
Simmel’s Theory of Money
For Simmel, value (Wert) arises in the opposition between subject and object. A thing that 
a human being enjoys without obstacle is not experienced as valuable; rather, “we call those 
objects valuable that resist our desire to possess them.”11 This entails that there is both a 
lower and an upper threshold for value. An entity that offers us no resistance possesses as 
little value as something that it is impossible to attain. An example Simmel offers illustrates 
this idea.12 The air we breathe does not acquire a value as long as it is freely available. Air 
7 The English translation is now in its third edition: Georg Simmel, The Philosophy of Money, 3rd ed., ed. Da-
vid Frisby, trans. Tom Bottomore and David Frisby from a first draft by Kaethe Mengelberg (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2004).
8 Georg Simmel, Filosofia del denaro, trans. Alessandro Cavalli, Renate Liebhart, and Lucio Perucchi (Turin: 
UTET, 1984).
9 Georg Simmel, Philosophie de l’argent, trans. Sabine Cornille and Philippe Ivernel (Paris: Presses universi-
taires de France, 1987).
10 Simmel, Philosophy of Money (as in note 7), 128–29. I have amended the Frisby/Bottomore translation in 
light of the German text: “Dies ist die philosophische Bedeutung des Geldes: daß es innerhalb der praktischen 
Welt die entschiedenste Sichtbarkeit, die deutlichste Wirklichkeit der Formel des allgemeinen Seins ist, nach 
der die Dinge ihren Sinn aneinander finden und die Gegenseitigkeit der Verhältnisse, in denen sie schweben, 
ihr Sein und Sosein ausmacht” (Philosophie des Geldes, ed. David P. Frisby and Klaus Christian Köhnke, Gesa-
mtausgabe 6 [Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1989], 136).
11 Philosophy of Money, 67 = Philosophie des Geldes, 35: “wir nennen diejenigen [Dinge] wertvoll, die unserer 
Begehrung, sie zu erlangen, Hemmnisse entgegensetzen.”
12 See ibid., 72/43. 
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becomes valuable only to someone who has difficulty breathing, or who is confined to life 
in a smog-filled city whose air presents itself as incompatible with human flourishing. At 
such a point, people become willing to pay for air, be it in the form of an oxygen tank or 
through a vacation in the countryside.
Simmel considers subject, object, and value as co-constitutional. Thus, just as value 
is a function of the distance between subject and object, so a sense of self arises only in a 
world experienced as ob-jective (as Gegen-stand, Heidegger might say, something “stand-
ing over against” us). Conversely, the world is “object” only to the extent that a self respects 
and values it. Otherwise, it becomes mere resource.13
Another way to approach the same issue is through the notion of sacrifice (Opfer): 
“Sacrifice is not only the condition for specific values, but—within the economic realm 
that concerns us here—the condition for value as such.”14 Attaining a value always re-
quires foregoing another. No value, therefore, exists on its own. It exists only in relation 
with other values in a system of exchange (Tausch). Simmel provides a basic example: “the 
exchange with nature which we call production.”15 As the subject recognizes the fruits of 
tilling the soil as valuable, he sacrifices a portion of his limited energies to agricultural labor. 
The concept of sacrifice complements the previous description of value in terms of subject 
and object, rather than changing or correcting it. Sacrifice must enter into our consider-
ation of the network of co-constitutional factors that constitute the human world, a world 
in which subject, object, value, and sacrifice enjoy equal primordiality.
Value, then, exists only in a system of economic exchange. In such a system, however, 
valuable objects acquire a certain independence from the subjects to the relationship with 
whom they owe their value. Someone who enters a car dealership to purchase a vehicle will 
find that this vehicle has an “objective” value, determined in relation to the values of oth-
er objects that circulate in the economic system. The exchange of a BMW between seller 
and buyer involves far more than their respective willingness to make sacrifices—the seller 
sacrificing possession of the car and the buyer a certain amount of money. It involves the 
relative value of the BMW in relation to other cars of the same brand, in relation to other 
brands, housing, clothes, food, and so on. The particular object of exchange thus derives its 
value from the place it occupies in the economic system as a whole. In a completely devel-
oped economy, Simmel writes, “objects circulate according to norms and measures which 
are fixed at any one moment, and through which [these objects] confront the individual 
as an objective realm.”16
Money constitutes a further step towards objectivity. Although money is nothing 
but the expression of the relativity of value as constituted in the system of subject, ob-
ject, exchange, and sacrifice that we just described, it represents such value as autonomous: 
13 See ibid., 71/42. Simmel’s reflections anticipate some central points in Heidegger’s philosophy of technology.
14 Ibid., 85/65. Translation amended.
15 Ibid., 84/63.
16 Ibid., 79/55. Translation amended. It is interesting that values still remain negotiable, even in the most 
highly developed economies. In such negotiations, intersubjective skills play an important role.
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“If the economic value of objects is constituted by their mutual relationship of exchange-
ability, then money is the autonomous expression of this relationship.”17 Put differently, 
“money is value frozen into substance, the value of things without the things themselves.”18 
Money is the exchange function represented as substance.
The idea that money is function-turned-substance raises two connected difficulties. 
The first concerns the “dual role”19 of money, which functions as the representation of 
value in a system of exchange, yet also circulates as an object within that system. In other 
words, money not only “is relation,” but it “has relation” as well: it not only represents value, 
it also possesses value.20 The dollars that change hands when a BMW is sold are themselves 
the object of exchange in the currency market; this latter role does not leave the former un-
affected (and vice versa). Simmel maintains that the dual role of money is necessary for the 
economic system. For, on the one hand, economic agents must regard money as the stable 
representation of value: this function places it outside the process of economic exchange. 
On the other hand, in particular transactions money must also be able to transfer value, in-
side the economic system, from one moment to the next: at t1, I had a BMW; at t2, I have a 
check for a certain dollar amount. In synchronic perspective, then, money only represents 
value, while in diachronic perspective it carries value.21
The dual role of money has historical roots. Before money consisted in nothing but 
numbers written on a check, or even digits appearing on a screen, its representative func-
tion was attached to a valuable substance. Simmel—characteristically without citing any 
sources—offers the example of marten furs in old Russia. Initially, these furs were them-
selves highly desirable objects of exchange, but as society developed the furs became stan-
dards of measurement for all other economic values: that is to say, they turned into mon-
ey. With this development, the substance that served to represent economic value shrunk, 
becoming increasingly symbolic. Thus, economic agents no longer carried entire pelts with 
them, but only their tips, and eventually small pieces of leather stamped by the govern-
17 Ibid., 120/122: “Wenn nun der wirtschaftliche Wert der Objekte in dem gegenseitigen Verhältnis besteht, 
das sie, als tauschbare, eingehen, so ist das Geld also der zur Selbständigkeit gelangte Ausdruck dieses Verhält-
nisses ….”
18 Ibid., 121/124: “es ist das zur Substanz erstarrte Gelten, das Gelten der Dinge ohne die Dinge selbst.” Trans-
lation amended. The German erstarrt literally means “stiffened”; I have translated it as “frozen.” More impor-
tantly, the verb gelten, used as a nominalized infinitive here, is etymologically related to the noun Geld, “money.” 
Simmel plays on this etymology. The translation of Gelten as “value” fails to capture the fact that Gelten ex-
presses an action: money is the process of representing value, frozen in a substance. 
19 Ibid., 122/125: “Doppelheit seiner Rollen.”
20 Ibid., 125/131. My translation. The German reads: “… so daß es, kurz gesagt, nicht mehr Relation ist, sondern 
Relation hat.”
21 On the significance of the dual role of money and the challenges it poses for economic theory, one may read 
the essay by Paschen von Flotow and Johannes Schmidt, “Die ‘Doppelrolle des Geldes’ bei Simmel und ihre 
(fehlende) Entsprechung in der modernen Wirtschaftstheorie,” in Georg Simmels Philosophie des Geldes. Ein-
hundert Jahre danach, ed. Jürgen G. Backhaus and Hans-Joachim Stadermann (Marburg: Metropolis, 2000), 
61–94. 
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ment.22 Simmel notes that the development of money from substance to function will 
never be complete because money “performs its services best when it is not simply money, 
that is, when it does not merely represent the value aspect of things in pure abstraction.”23 
He offers several arguments, of which the most important one concerns the need to limit 
the supply of money. It is “technically impractical [or imprudent: untunlich] to accomplish 
what is conceptually required, [namely,] the transfer of the money function to pure token 
money, its complete detachment from any substantial value that could limit the quantity 
of money.”24 Since the abolition of the gold standard, what Simmel still regarded as “im-
prudent” has of course occurred, that is to say, the detachment of the money function from 
any substratum that could limit arbitrary multiplication. This decoupling of function from 
substance has led to an explosion of wealth worldwide, but also to an unprecedented accu-
mulation of debt and mounting social tensions. Whether the experiment will work or Sim-
mel will in the end be proven right is something only the future can tell.
Money as the Paradigm of All Being
We are now ready to return to our quotation, according to which money is “the clear-
est embodiment of the formula of all being.” Simmel conceives of money as substanzge-
wordene Relativität, to use a particularly pithy phrase from the Philosophy of Money: “rela-
tivity turned substance.”25 If it is in money that the structure of reality is thrown into the 
clearest relief, then is being nothing but “relativity turned substance”?
Exactly. Simmel subscribes to what he very bluntly calls a “relativistic world view.”26 
This phrase does not indicate skepticism, but rather the primacy of relation over substance 
in the constitution of the human world. Simmel declares:
But practical consciousness has discovered the form [that makes it possible] to unite the process-
es of relationship or interaction, in which reality takes place, with the substantial existence in 
which praxis must clothe the abstract relation as such. Such a projection of mere relations into 
particular objects is one of the great accomplishments of the mind, in that in [this projection] 
the mind is indeed embodied, yet only in order to make the corporeal into a receptacle of the 
mind and thus to bestow upon the latter a fuller and livelier reality. In money, the ability to con-
struct such formations has attained its greatest triumph.27
22 For this example, see Philosophy of Money, 150/169.
23 Ibid., 165/193. Translation amended.
24 Ibid. The translation is mine. The German reads: “Aber eben die Realisierung dieses begrifflich Geforderten, 
der Übergang der Geldfunktion an ein reines Zeichengeld, ihre völlige Lösung von jedem, die Geldquantität 
einschränkenden Substanzwert ist technisch untunlich ….”
25 Ibid., 127/134. Frisby/Bottomore translate “embodied relativity,” but that is too imprecise and weak.
26 Ibid., 101/15: “relativistisches Weltbild.” Note that the section titles that appear in the English translation 
have been derived from Simmel’s detailed table of contents.
27 Ibid., 129/137. The translation is mine. The German reads: “Das praktische Bewußtsein aber hat die Form 
gefunden, um die Vorgänge der Beziehung oder der Wechselwirkung, in der die Wirklichkeit verläuft, mit der 
substanziellen Existenz zu vereinigen, in die die Praxis eben die abstrakte Beziehung als solche kleiden muß. 
Jene Projizierung bloßer Verhältnisse auf Sondergebilde ist eine der großen Leistungen des Geistes, indem in 
ihr der Geist zwar verkörpert wird, aber nur um das Körperhafte zum Gefäß des Geistigen zu machen und die-
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Some commentators have taken this “somewhat obscure” passage as an indication 
of Simmel’s indebtedness to Hegel’s notion of objective spirit.28 While this interpretation 
is not absurd, it is too precise. Simmel views his thought as a confluence of many sources. 
In one passage he likens money to Plato’s (and Schopenhauer’s) ideas, to the Stoic logoi, to 
Kant’s a priori, and finally to “stages in the development of reason as with Hegel”29—all in 
one sentence. Clearly, Simmel does not care too much about the finer distinctions in the 
history of philosophic doctrines.
In the excerpt just quoted, what stands out is the emphasis on the practical dimen-
sion of the process in which the mind freezes function into substance. Also, if we look 
back at Simmel’s programmatic statement regarding the paradigmatic role of money for 
the comprehension of “all being,” we notice that he speaks of the “practical world.” This 
emphasis suggests an interpretation along Heideggerian lines. In the human world, prac-
tice precedes theory; we encounter things as ready-to-hand (zuhanden) before they be-
come present-at-hand (vorhanden). But the practical world is a network of relationships: 
the hammer derives its meaning from the relations in which it stands to the nail, the wall, 
the picture to be mounted, and the hand that holds it. Before the hammer becomes an 
“object,” it is a piece of equipment (Zeug) that is defined by the place it occupies—which 
means, the significance it possesses—within the human world. The substance of the ham-
mer exists as the focal point of the relations in which the tool stands with its environment. 
This does not mean that the human mind creates the hammer in its physical substrate. The 
point is that this physical substrate exists as hammer only because of the significance be-
stowed upon it by the network of relationships in which it is involved.30
We are dealing here with a practical transformation of the Kantian a priori. The 
world appears to us within a framework of human meanings that give it coherence: “[The 
entities that] we characterize as associated in the external world, that is, as somehow uni-
fied and existing in each other, actually always remain adjacent to each other, and in refer-
ring to this association we mean something that we can ‘feel’ only from within ourselves 
into the things, something that is incomparable to anything external ….”31
Simmel goes beyond Kant, not only in giving the a priori a practical bent, but also in 
positing a dialectical relationship between subject and object. The world of meaning is not 
sem damit eine vollere und lebendigere Wirklichkeit zu gewähren. Mit dem Gelde hat die Fähigkeit zu solchen 
Bildungen ihren höchsten Triumph gefeiert.” 
28 Gianfranco Poggi, Money and the Modern Mind: Georg Simmel’s Philosophy of Money (Berkeley and Lon-
don: University of California Press, 1993), 108.
29 Philosophy of Money, 121/124.
30 Simmel makes this point clear by means of a religious example: “every sacramental object,” he writes, is “the 
relation-turned-substance between man and his God” (ibid., 129/136; my translation). The German phrase for 
“relation-turned-substance” is das substanziierte Verhältnis. Thus, for example, water certainly exists as H2O 
without human intervention; yet this H2O is endowed with an entirely new meaning in the baptismal font. 
31 Ibid., 472/656–7. Translation amended. The German reads: “Was wir als in der Außenwelt verbunden, d. 
h. doch, irgendwie vereinheitlicht und ineinander seiend, bezeichnen, bleibt doch in der Außenwelt ewig ne-
beneinander, und mit seinem Verbundensein meinen wir etwas, was nur aus unserem Inneren, allem Äußeren 
unvergleichbar, in die Dinge hineingefühlt werden lann ….” 
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constituted by a transcendental subjectivity that floats above experience; rather, the sub-
ject is constituted by what it constitutes: “Thus there exists a relativism, as it were an un-
ending process between internal and external life: the one as the symbol of the other, mak-
ing it conceivable and representable, being neither the first nor the second, but realizing 
the unity of their—that is, our—essence by their mutual dependency.”32 We will return to 
this point later.33
One final remark about the primacy of the practical in Simmel. Simmel holds a view 
of truth that is pragmatist: “In fact, we do not have any other definitive criterion for the 
truth of the representation of a being, except that the actions based upon [that representa-
tion] lead to the desired consequences.”34 Thus, when he speaks of the paradigmatic role 
of money for practical consciousness, the emphasis on the practical entails no limitation. 
Theory builds on praxis rather than preceding it.35
To sum up, then, for Simmel the human world is a network of ultimately practical 
significance that is held together by a subject who “feels” these structures of meaning into 
reality. In the world around us we encounter nodes of meaning that arise in our dynamic 
interaction with our environment; the mind freezes these dynamic relationships into per-
manence by projecting them into substances. Likewise, money is initially nothing but the 
representation of value that comes into being as objects enter into relationship with each 
other in a network of economic exchange; in order to represent this value, the mind freez-
es it into substance. Lastly, the mind itself is not a substance existing independently of the 
structures that it constitutes; rather, it forms part of the system of relativity in which it acts.
III. Money as the Purest Form of the Tool
The mind does not act upon the world without mediation: it is incarnate. But more than 
that, what distinguishes human beings from animals is the fact that man is capable of ex-
tending and refining the functions of his body by means of tools. I have eyes to see, but a 
magnifying glass helps me discern small details invisible to the naked eye. I have feet to 
walk, but a horse, carriage, or car will allow me to travel faster and with less effort. I have 
hands to manipulate objects around me, but a hammer will amplify the blows of my fist 
and allow me to focus it on something as small as a nail.
Simmel analyzes the tool in connection with what he calls the “sequence of purpos-
es.” In the practical world, the subject relates to his or her object as an end; put differently, 
human action has a purposive structure. I focus on an apple initially because I am hungry 
32 Ibid., 472/657. I have slightly altered the translation of this difficult German sentence: “So besteht ein Rela-
tivismus, gleichsam ein unendlicher Prozeß zwischen dem Inneren und dem Äußeren: eines, als das Symbol des 
anderen, dieses zur Vorstellbarkeit und Darstellbarkeit bringend, keines das erste, keines das zweite, sondern in 
ihrem Aufeinander-Angewiesensein die Einheit ihres, d. h. unseres Wesens verwirklichend.”
33 In section IV below.
34 Philosophy of Money, 108/103. Translation amended.
35 For the pragmatist dimension of the Philosophy of Money, see Alois Halbmayr, Gott und Geld in Wechsel-
wirkung. Zur Relativität der Gottesrede (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2009), 206–13. Halbmayr’s study also offers an 
in-depth interpretation of Simmel’s relativism.
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and believe it will satisfy my hunger; admiring it for its beauty and making a painting of it 
come later. In a primitive society, nothing may mediate between my hunger and the apple: 
I go to the apple tree, pick the fruit, and eat it. With increased cultural sophistication, how-
ever, a society will interpose more and more steps between the desiring subject and its end: 
as a consequence, the teleological series will grow longer. “The average number of links” in 
this series, Simmel writes, “indicates the degree of knowledge and control of nature, as well 
as the breadth and refinement of the way of life.”36 Consider the length of the chain of pro-
duction and transportation that is involved in bringing the enjoyment of French apple ci-
der to a customer shopping at a supermarket in Texas.
A tool is an object whose entire meaning is derived from its role in such a teleological 
series. Practically speaking, it has no existence in and for itself, but is embodied function. 
To be sure, the hammer has a wooden or plastic handle and a metal head, but its meaning 
derives, on the one hand, from the human hand for which the handle was made, and, on 
the other, from the nail that the face is shaped to strike. Still, a hammer cannot function 
without a certain weight: its function calls for substance. It is not a “pure” tool. Indeed, in 
the human world of embodied minds and their objects, pure function cannot exist. But if 
there is a tool that approaches purity of function as closely as possible, it is money: “Mon-
ey is the purest form of the tool,” Simmel declares.37 And he elaborates:
Money is perhaps the most decisive demonstration and expression of the fact that man is the 
“tool-making” animal, which is, however, itself connected with the fact that man is the “pur-
pose-positing” animal. The concept of means characterizes the position of man in the world: he 
is not tied, as the animal is, to the mechanism of instinctual life and the immediacy of volition 
and enjoyment, nor does he have unmediated power—of the kind we attribute to a God—so 
that his will is as such identical with its realization.38
So, just as money led us to the very structure of being, it offers the key to understand-
ing the human condition.
The purity of money as a tool is due to several factors. First, money requires only a 
minimum of substance to function (like the digits on a screen that we mentioned earlier). 
Second, money is the “absolute means” (das absolute Mittel), the “means as such” (das Mit-
tel schlechthin)39 because, unlike other tools, it is only minimally configured for a particu-
lar subject while bearing no inherent relation at all to a specific object. To return to our ex-
ample of the hammer: the handle of the hammer is made for the grip of the human hand, 
while its head reflects a particular purpose, such as driving in nails (with a poll), removing 
36 Philosophy of Money, 207/259.
37 Ibid., 210/263.
38 Ibid., 211/264–65. Translation amended. The German reads: “Es ist vielleicht der entschiedenste Beweis 
und Ausdruck dafür, daß der Mensch das ‘werkzeugmachende’ Tier ist, was freilich damit zusammenhängt, 
daß er das ‘zwecksetzende’ Tier ist. Die Idee des Mittels bezeichnet überhaupt die Weltstellung des Menschen: 
er ist nicht wie das Tier an den Mechanismus des Trieblebens und die Unmittelbarkeit von Wollen und Ge-
nießen gebunden, er hat aber auch nicht die unmittelbare Macht—wie wir sie an einem Gotte denken—, daß 
sein Wille schon an und für sich Verwirklichung des Gewollten sei.”
39 Ibid., 211/264 (das absolute Mittel) and 265 (das Mittel schlechthin). 
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them (with a claw), or hammering metal into shape (with a peen). A dollar bill, by contrast, 
is a dollar bill is a dollar bill … in other words, it can be used by anyone to purchase any-
thing. There is only one limitation: to the extent that different countries have different cur-
rencies, the dollar is more appropriate for use in the United States than in Mexico or China.
The fact that money is the purest form of the tool produces two consequences that 
bring it in relation with the religious realm.
In God We Trust
We have already discussed the historical 
trajectory in which money came to be in-
creasingly detached from substance. Such 
detachment is possible only on the ba-
sis of trust. Thus, an economic agent will 
accept a stamped piece of leather, rath-
er than an entire pelt, as a valid form of 
payment only if he can be confident that 
the piece of leather represents a stable val-
ue which corresponds to the value of the 
goods sold. If he had to fear that the piece 
of leather did not represent a stable value, 
he would not accept it as payment, so that 
the exchange would be unable to occur or 
the trading partners would have to resort 
to barter. Such loss of trust is what typical-
ly occurs in conditions of hyperinflation: 
the currency collapses.
Simmel maintains that the functioning of the money economy always requires trust, 
even when the currency is tied to precious metals. To be sure, a gold coin requires less trust 
from its user than a banknote, but even gold cannot guarantee the stability of the currency 
absolutely. Gold itself can gain and lose value. Secondly, “in everyday transactions an exam-
ination of the metallic substance of the coin is feasible only in exceptional cases.”40 Rulers 
and governments of all ages haves exploited this fact to debase their coinage.
The trust that is at the heart of the money economy is well summarized in a phrase 
that the Order of St. John of Jerusalem placed on many of its coins when it ruled over Mal-
ta: non aes sed fides, “not bronze but faith.”41 The inscription goes back to Grand Master 
Jean de La Valette (1557–1568), who decided to strike fiduciary coins to raise funds after 
the siege of the Turks and to pay for the construction of the new city of Valletta. Thus, the 
Maltese mint started using copper for denominations that would normally be struck on sil-
ver, such as the “tari.” Those who accepted these coins as payment needed to have faith in 
40 Ibid., 178/215. Translation amended.
41 See ibid.
Figure 1: A 100 billion banknote issued by the city of 
Bielefeld (Westphalia) in 1923. The apocalyptic scenes on the 
obverse are meant to capture the spirit of the times. 
(From the author’s collection.)
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the Grand Master’s promise that the cop-
per coins could be redeemed in precious 
metal. However, due to the precarious 
military and economic situation of Malta 
throughout the rule of the Order, fiducia-
ry coins kept multiplying under successive 
grand masters. Various attempts to recall 
them ultimately failed, so that the trust 
placed in them was disappointed.42
Having offered the Maltese exam-
ple, Simmel launches into an analysis of 
the structure of faith. He notes that every 
type of economic exchange—even the ex-
change with nature of which we talked earlier—would be impossible without faith: “If 
the farmer did not believe that his field would bear grain this year just as much as in for-
mer years, he would not sow; if the trader did not believe that the public would desire his 
goods, he would not purchase them; etc.”43 Yet the faith that money requires sets it apart:
But in the case of credit, of trust in someone, there is an additional element which is hard to de-
scribe: it is most clearly embodied in religious faith. When someone says that he believes in God, 
this does not merely express an imperfect stage of knowledge about God, but a state of mind 
which has nothing to do with knowledge, which is both less and more than knowledge. To “be-
lieve in someone,” without adding or even clearly conceiving what it is that one believes about 
him, is to employ a very subtle and profound idiom. It expresses the feeling that there exists be-
tween our idea of a being and the being itself a definite connection and unity, a certain consis-
tency in our conception of it, an assurance and lack of resistance in the surrender of the ego to 
this conception, which may rest on particular reasons, but does not consist in them. Economic 
credit, too, often contains an element of this supra-theoretical belief, and so does the trust that 
the community will, for the symbolic signs for which we have exchanged the products of our la-
bor, grant us the concrete corresponding values.44
Simmel’s claim in this passage is astonishing. In order to account for the trust on 
which economic exchange relies—and in particular the trust in the reliability of our cur-
rency—he invokes belief in a personal God. This belief may lack the certainty of knowledge, 
yet in other ways it reaches beyond knowledge, especially in eliciting a personal adherence 
42 For further reading on the history of Malta’s fiduciary coinage, see Michael Sant, “The First Minting of 
Fiduciary Copper Coinage in Malta: 1565 or 1566?,” Melita historica 5:4 (1971): 277–81, and the same author’s 
“Minting and Attempted Recalling of Fiduciary Copper Coinage in Malta,” Melita historica 6:1 (1972): 60–80. 
The standard catalog referred to in the caption of figure 2 is Felice Restelli and Joseph C. Sammut, The Coinage 
of the Knights in Malta, 2 vols. (Valletta: Emmanuel Said Publishers, 1977).
43 Philosophy of Money, 179/216. Translation amended.
44 Ibid. Translation amended, in particular the last sentence: “Auch der wirtschaftliche Kredit enthält in viel-
en Fällen ein Element dieses übertheoretischen Glaubens, und nicht weniger tut dies jenes Vertrauen auf die 
Allgemeinheit, daß sie uns für die symbolischen Zeichen, für die wir die Produkte unserer Arbeit hingegeben 
haben, die konkreten Gegenwerte gewähren wird.”
Figure 2: Non aes sed fides—a Maltese 4 tari copper coin mint-
ed in 1567 under Grand Master Jean de la Valette. Note the 
shaking hands as a symbol of trust. (Restelli/Sammut # 103)
(By kind permission of Mr. John Gatt, coinsofmalta.com.)
Plain edge
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that stems from profound confidence.45 In the economic order, we invest a “quasi-reli-
gious faith”46 in the community, trusting that its members will remain willing to exchange 
the “symbolic signs” which we use as money for real-world goods—that pure function will 
eventually translate back into substance.
Since 1957, all American currency carries the motto, “In God We Trust.” The use of 
this motto can be traced back to 1864, when it first appeared on a two-cent coin. The in-
tention was always to acknowledge the existence of God on the country’s very currency, so 
that no economic transaction could occur without at least implicit recognition of the De-
ity. The use of God’s name on money was, however, not uncontroversial. In 1907, Presi-
dent Theodore Roosevelt reacted with revulsion to the suggestion that “In God We Trust” 
should be placed on a new ten-dollar gold coin: “My own feeling in this matter,” he wrote, 
“is due to my very firm conviction that to put such a motto on coins, or to use it in any kin-
dred manner, not only does no good but does positive harm, and is in effect irreverence, 
which comes dangerously close to sacrilege.”47 Despite such reservations, in the 1950s the 
use of the motto was broadened to include all coins and banknotes. This measure occurred 
in the atmosphere of the Cold War, with the intention to set the United States apart from 
the atheism of the communist world. Representative Charles E. Bennett of Florida, who in-
troduced the relevant legislation (H.R. 619) in the House in 1954, argued that, “[i]n these 
days when imperialistic and materialistic communism seeks to attack and destroy freedom, 
we should continuously look for ways to strengthen the foundations of our freedom. At the 
base of our freedom is our faith in God …. To serve as a constant reminder of this truth, it is 
45 Thomas Aquinas, too, holds that faith is both more and less certain than knowledge (scientia), although his 
reasoning differs from Simmel’s; see Summa theologiae II-II, qu. 5, art 8: Utrum fides sit certior scientia et aliis 
virtutibus intellectualibus. 
46 Philosophy of Money, 179/216. More literally, the German speaks of a “‘faith’ that is related to religious faith” 
(… dem religiösen verwandten “Glaubens”).
47 Quoted in T. Jeremy Gunn, Spiritual Weapons: The Cold War and the Forging of an American National 
Religion (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2009), 67.
Figure 3: The phrase “In God We Trust” on the reverse of an American one-dollar banknote.
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highly desirable that our currency and coins should bear these inspiring words, ‘In God We 
Trust.’”48 H.R. 619 created the modern-day equivalent of sacred money: currency that ob-
jectifies group cohesion by invoking the group’s shared faith. Simmel clearly saw the possi-
bility that the faith which money requires must ultimately be anchored in the sacred,49 but 
he has been criticized for not pursuing this line of inquiry more vigorously.50
God and Money in the Sequence of Purposes
We have already touched upon what Simmel calls the “sequence of purposes” (Zweckreihe). 
Our example was an apple. An apple has value for human beings because it is able to satis-
fy a basic human need. As “tool-making animals,” however, we typically do not simply grab 
an apple from a tree and eat it. A whole series of means is able to insert itself between us 
and the apple: thus, the apple itself stands at the end of a long chain of production, while 
a consumer’s ability to reach the apple depends upon access to a supermarket, which re-
quires transportation, which requires money, which requires a job, which requires … and 
so on and so forth.
Furthermore, the apple is not an end in itself. We do not find that the consumption 
of an apple is an absolute value; rather, it is a means to sustain us in our quest for greater 
ends. Human experience shows us, however, that these greater ends tend to recede toward 
an infinite horizon: I eat the apple so that I have the strength to work; I work so that I have 
income; I need income to pay the bills; I pay the bills in the hope that, one day, I will be 
able to retire. In retirement, I can finally go on a cruise; on the cruise, I can relax and feast 
on the “all-you-can-eat” buffet; I subsequently need to lose weight so that I join the health 
club; and this series goes on and on. “To summarize,” writes Simmel, “it appears as if what 
we call the ultimate purpose floats above the teleological sequences, standing in the same 
relation to them as the horizon does to the earthly paths that always lead towards it, yet 
which, after the longest wanderings, never seem to be any closer to it than at the outset.”51
Given the elusiveness of the ultimate purpose, as well as the fact that any purpose is 
best served if one focuses one’s strength upon the means that lead towards it, means have 
a tendency to overshadow and absorb their ends—especially if these ends are remote. Sim-
mel terms this phenomenon the “psychological growth of means into ends.”52 This growth 
of means into ends—or, rather, this deformation53—paradoxically affects money more 
48 Quoted ibid., 68.
49 Simmel mentions sacred money in Philosophy of Money, 187/229.
50 For this criticism, see Claus Thomasberger and Klaus Voy, “Geldtheorie und Geldgeschichte. Überlegun-
gen zum Zusammenhang beider, angeregt durch Simmels Versuch, der Ausgrenzung der Geschichte aus der 
theoretischen Geldforschung entgegenzutreten,” in Georg Simmels Philosophie des Geldes (cited in note 21 
above), 217–70.
51 Philosophy of Money, 235/303. Translation amended.
52 Ibid., 228/17: “das psychologische Auswachsen der Mittel zu Zwecken.” 
53 The German Auswachsen suggests deformation rather than natural growth. One of the examples offered in 
the Grimms’ famous Deutsches Wörterbuch is, sie hat einen etwas ausgewachsenen rücken, “she has a somewhat 
hunched back.” The Grimm is available online at http://dwb.uni-trier.de/de/.
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than any other means, despite the fact that it is the most empty of them all. Since every 
other economic value can be represented by money, the latter takes on an absolute value, 
even with connotations of omnipotence. These reflections lead us to one of the most stun-
ning passages in the Philosophy of Money:
It may appear as an irony of history that, at the moment when the satisfying and ultimate pur-
poses of life become atrophied, precisely that value which is exclusively a means and nothing 
else takes their place and clothes itself in their form. But in reality, money as the absolute means 
and thus as the unifying point of innumerable sequences of purposes, in its psychological form 
possesses significant relationships to the notion of God—relationships that only psychology, 
which has the privilege of being unable to commit blasphemy, may disclose. The notion of God 
has its deeper essence in this, that all diversities and contradictions in the world achieve a unity 
in him, that he is—according to a beautiful formulation of Nicholas of Cusa—the coincidentia 
oppositorum. Out of this idea, that in him all estrangements and all irreconcilables of being find 
their unity and equalization, there arise the peace, the security, [and] the all-embracing wealth 
of feeling which reverberate with the notion of God and [with the notion] that we have him.54
The structural affinity between the notions of money and of God may well explain, 
muses Simmel, why religion tends to view money with particular animosity. In the Chris-
tian tradition, the Bible is clear that “no man can serve two masters. For either he will hate 
the one, and love the other: or he will sustain the one, and despise the other. You cannot 
serve God and mammon” (Mt 6:24). The choice is binary here, with no middle ground. 
All means either dissolve in money, which thus takes on the appearance of a final purpose, 
or they are absorbed into God, who fills them with ultimate content. Is the choice one be-
tween substance and function?55
IV. Having and Being
Earlier on in this essay, we hinted at the fact that Simmel’s “relativist”—it might be better to 
say, “relational”—understanding of reality is all-encompassing. The author of the Philosophy 
of Money does not merely believe that the practical mind organizes the world in relational 
54 Philosophy of Money, 236/305. Translation amended. The German reads: “Es kann als eine Ironie der his-
torischen Entwicklung erscheinen, daß in dem Augenblick, wo die inhaltlich befriedigenden und abschließen-
den Lebenszwecke atrophisch werden, gerade derjenige Wert, der ausschließlich ein Mittel und weiter nichts 
ist, in ihre Stelle hineinwächst und sich mit ihrer Form bekleidet. Allein in Wirklichkeit hat das Geld, als das 
absolute Mittel und dadurch als der Einheitspunkt unzähliger Zweckreihen, in seiner psychologischen Form 
bedeutsame Beziehungen gerade zu der Gottesvorstellung, die freilich die Psychologie nur aufdecken kann, 
weil es ihr Privilegium ist, keine Blasphemien begehen zu können. Der Gottesgedanke hat sein tieferes Wesen 
darin, daß alle Mannigfaltigkeiten und Gegensätze der Welt in ihm zur Einheit gelangen, daß er nach dem 
schönen Worte des Nikolaus von Kusa die Coincidentia oppositorum ist. Aus dieser Idee, daß alle Fremd-
heiten und Unversöhntheiten des Seins in ihm ihre Einheit und Ausgleichung finden, stammt der Friede, die 
Sicherheit, der allumfassende Reichtum des Gefühls, das mit der Vorstellung Gottes und daß wir ihn haben, 
mitschwebt.” I have added the emphasis on have for clarity.
55 Alois Halbmayr has devoted a detailed study to the affinity between the notions of God and money; see 
Gott und Geld in Wechselwirkung, cited in note 35 above. For further reflection on the religious dimension of 
Simmel’s thought, one may read John McCole, “Georg Simmel and the Philosophy of Religion,” New German 
Critique 94 (Winter, 2005): 8–35.
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structures; that is to say, that we encounter reality through the teleological series discussed 
in the previous section. Rather, our own subjectivity, our “internal life,” is constituted in rela-
tion to the external world into which we “feel” (hineinfühlen) our purposes. We have already 
quoted the following sentence: “Thus there exists a relativism, as it were an unending process 
between internal and external life: the one as the symbol of the other, making it conceivable 
and representable, being neither the first nor the second, but realizing the unity of their—
that is, our—essence by their mutual dependency.”56 Now it is a matter of understanding it.
Just as Simmel conceives of substance as a knot of relations, so he regards the self as 
a center of activity. Furthermore, it follows from this view that the relationship between 
the self and the substances which make up its world is more than merely a static “having.” 
For Simmel, such static possession approximates to non-being, to a “zero point” between 
the movement toward possession of an object and its active use: “Ownership as the point 
of indifference between the movement that leads towards it and the movement that leads 
beyond it shrinks to zero.”57 Static ownership is a “metaphysical” concept (perhaps some-
thing like the Kantian thing-in-itself ), a placeholder for the totality of actions and enjoy-
ments in which a particular object can be involved.58
The possession of an object is dynamic not only because the owner most fully “has” 
the object when he incorporates it into his sequence of purposes.59 It is dynamic also be-
cause that which is actively owned in turn shapes its owner. Simmel illustrates this point by 
giving a few examples:
Whoever owns an estate or a factory (insofar as he does not leave the management to somebody 
else and becomes a rentier), [or] whoever owns a picture gallery or a racing stable as his central 
piece of possession, no longer has a completely free existence. This means not only that his time 
is taken up to a particular extent and in a particular form; above all, it means that a specific ca-
pacity is presupposed. … Just as the possession of specific objects is all the more genuine and ac-
tive the more decisively and unambiguously the subject is suited for them, so the reverse is just 
as true: the more fundamentally and intensively the possession is really owned—that is, is made 
useful and enjoyed—the more decisive and determining will be the effects upon the internal 
and external nature of the subject.60
The quotation makes us think of the “types” of people who used to be associated 
with particular professions: the English banker in pinstripe suit and bowler hat, and nev-
er without umbrella; the country landlord in his tweed jacket and Garforth cap; or the 
Southern cattle herder in cowboy hat and boots. Their professions—and this means, their 
active relations with particular types of objects—gave these people particular personalities, 
shaping them down to the level of their external appearance.
56 Philosophy of Money, 472/657. First quoted at the end of section II above.
57 Ibid., 304/406.
58 Ibid., 306/408.
59 Again, Simmel’s reflections here foreshadow Heidegger’s view according to which the practical world of 
“items of equipment” (Zeuge) grounds and precedes the theoretical world of objects.
60 Philosophy of Money, 306–07/409–10. Translation amended. The Bottomore/Frisby translation is quite 
defective here.
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Money, Simmel claims, has the tendency to sever this connection between having 
and being. As pure function, money so to speak lacks the substance to limit the freedom 
of those who possess it, but with that, it also lacks the ability to shape its owners. Mon-
ey is itself without character, since it represents value in general, but no value in particu-
lar. If my possessions consist of money, rather than of land or a workshop where objects 
are manufactured by means of specific tools, I will no longer experience the constraints 
that arise from objects, which stand “over against” (ob-) me. Money does not need to be 
fed and milked, like cows, nor do I have to send it reminders when it does not pay the 
rent that I am owed. By comparison with other tools, the use of which has to be learned, 
money offers minimal pushback in relation to the human will.61 The subject experiences 
him- or herself as omnipotent while at the same time losing personal character. Thus, the 
business owner turns into an “entrepreneur,” who invests into a whole range of businesses 
about which he knows nothing in particular, except that they are profitable. Conversely, 
the skilled laborer who knew how to extract coal from a mine or assemble pieces of wood 
into furniture is replaced by members of an amorphous “work force” whose main charac-
teristic is to possess “transferable skills.” In this way, the freedom that was gained at a lower 
level—namely, the freedom from the need to master a particular craft, as well as the need 
to work with particular people—is replaced by enslavement to an impersonal economic 
system. The result is what Simmel repeatedly calls a “soulless” society.62 Its members expe-
rience freedom as freedom from constraints rather than as the freedom to pursue certain 
ends.63 Simmel does not regard these developments as entirely negative, especially if one 
compares the functionalism of the money economy with the highly personal obligations 
under which people used to labor. Yet he sees the downsides very clearly.
V. Conclusion
This essay has focused on the most fundamental claims that Simmel advances in his Phi-
losophy of Money: money most clearly reveals the structure of all being, it is key to under-
standing the nature of the human being as a tool-making animal, and it exhibits significant 
structural similarities with the notion of God. With these three claims—metaphysical/
epistemological,64 anthropological, and theological—Simmel places money at the center 
61 As the example of the banker shows, ownership of money can shape a personality. According to Simmel, 
this is due to the fact that money derives a certain quality from its very quantity. In turn, a personality, or even 
the spirit of a nation, can confer upon wealth a particular character. See Philosophy of Money, 259–80/338–71.
62 Ibid., 346/468, 467/648.
63 See ibid., 402/552: “It is true he [i.e., the peasant] gained freedom, but only freedom from something, not 
freedom to do something. Apparently, he gained freedom to do anything—because it was purely negative—but 
in fact he was without any directive, without any definite and determining content. Such freedom favors that 
emptiness and instability that allows one to give full rein to every accidental, whimsical, and tempting impulse. 
Such freedom may be compared with the fate of the unmoored [ungefestet] person who has forsworn his gods 
and whose newly acquired ‘freedom’ only provides the opportunity for making an idol out of every fleeting 
value.” Translation amended. 
64 Simmel squarely belongs in the Kantian tradition. Thus, strictly speaking, he does not advance any meta-
physical theory, but rather a theory about the structures within which human beings encounter reality.
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of philosophic reflection. Furthermore, Simmel believes that the de-substantialization of 
money is a critical element in the development of social relations. As we have seen in the 
beginning of the essay, Simmel’s focus on money is less eccentric than it may appear: mon-
ey may well have played a crucial role in the cultural reconfiguration within which the 
birth of philosophy became possible in the first place.
I would like to conclude this essay on a pedagogical note. Given the centrality of 
money in these days of post-industrial capitalism, Georg Simmel’s Philosophy of Money is 
an ideal work to demonstrate the relevance of philosophic reflection to students in insti-
tutions of higher education. Unfortunately, Simmel’s dense style as well as the sheer length 
of the Philosophy of Money stand in the way of a more widespread use of his work. An 
abridged edition and translation would therefore make an extremely welcome addition to 
the philosophical literature.
VI. Postscript: A Note on the Emergency Money from Bielefeld
In figure 1 of this article, we saw a banknote for 100 billion marks, issued in 1923 by the city 
of Bielefeld in Westphalia (Germany). The “emergency money,” or Notgeld, from Bielefeld 
has acquired a certain fame among collectors for its vivid artistic representation of the so-
cial conditions that accompany hyperinflation.
As Simmel maintains, money requires trust. Such trust is all the more necessary in 
the case of our modern de-substantialized currencies, where it is not coins of gold or sil-
ver that exchange hands, but pieces of paper—and, increasingly, bits of information read 
from the chips of credit or debit cards. Under these conditions, “[t]he value of money is 
based on a guarantee represented by the central political power, which eventually replaces 
the significance of the metal.”65 At this stage of our reflections on the Philosophy of Mon-
ey, we will not be surprised that Simmel considers the relationship between money and the 
authority that issues or guarantees it to be reciprocal. Thus, not only does an economy re-
lying on de-substantialized money require a strong state, but in turn “[t]he modern cen-
tralized state … came into being partly as a result of the prodigious growth of the money 
economy ….”66
A further consequence follows from these reflections. We discovered earlier that, 
for Simmel, “money is value frozen into substance, the value of things without the things 
themselves.”67 But money is also trust frozen into substance, that is to say, it represents 
the trust among the members of the society in which it circulates, without these mem-
bers themselves. We could therefore call money an “objectification of the social whole”68—
65 Philosophy of Money, 184/224–25. The translation here is more of a paraphrase of Simmel’s complex Ger-
man: “Es ist die Sicherheit des Geldes, auf der sein Wert ruht und als deren Träger die politische Zentralgewalt 
allmählich durch die unmittelbare Bedeutung des Metalls, sie verdrängend, hindurchwächst.”
66 Ibid., 185/226.
67 Ibid., 121/124; quoted in section II above. 
68 Ibid., 187/228; trans. amended. The German has “Objektivierung der Gruppengesamtheit.” We are going 
beyond Simmel here, who says only that such objectification is “a prerequisite of money.”
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trust turned substance, so to speak, but with the interesting corollary that the more trust 
there exists, the less substance is necessary to represent it.
Hyperinflation arises in conditions where the trust that money requires has broken 
down, but where the society affected by this collapse has no way to re-substantialize its curren-
cy: to move from banknotes to gold and silver coins, for example. In such circumstances, giv-
ing up a valuable object in exchange for mere money creates a greater and greater—perhaps ul-
timately infinite—sense of sacrifice. Even trillions of dollars will no longer be able to satisfy it.
The emergency money from Bielefeld beautifully and starkly illustrates the social dis-
integration in which hyperinflation occurs: it is distrust objectified. When, in the wake of 
the First World War, inflation in Germany spiraled out of control at an increasingly fren-
zied pace, the Reichsbank was eventually no longer able to keep up the money supply. Even 
measures like simply stamping “one billion” (1 Milliarde) over banknotes with a denom-
ination of one thousand marks provided no lasting relief. At this point, local institutions 
stepped in by issuing their own banknotes. The city of Bielefeld did this through its own 
bank, the Stadt-Sparkasse Bielefeld. From the beginning, however, the emergency money 
from Bielefeld was devised to be special: designed by local artists to document the despair 
and social upheaval that afflicted post-war Germany, the currency which the Sparkasse is-
sued was advertised as an object for collectors. To increase its collectability, it was printed 
not only on paper but also on burlap, linen, silk, and velvet.69
69 The history of the Notgeld from Bielefeld is chronicled in Günter Gerke, Das Geld der mageren Jahre—als 
alle Milliardäre waren. Bielefelder Notgeld 1917–1924. Geschichten und Dokumente (Bielefeld and Potsdam: 
Verlag Hans Gieselmann, 1998). The longtime director of the Stadt-Sparkasse Bielefeld describes the emergency 
money in a fictitious dialogue between a father and a son who are looking back at the history of Bielefeld in 
the year 2000: Paul Hanke, “Bielefelder Notgeld nach 80 Jahren,” Niedersachsen, vol. 26, no. 21 ( July 10, 1921): 
505–07.
Figure 4: A banknote for 10 trillion dollars from the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, issued in 2008.
(From the author’s collection.)
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The one hundred billion banknote depicted in figure 1 above demonstrates the cra-
zy pace at which the inflation occurred; for its obverse reprises the motif from a one hun-
dred mark banknote issued just two years earlier.70 The scene on the left and on the right 
mirror each other, each showing a group of women who appear to be congregating around 
a bearded figure—some kind of sage no doubt. In the foreground we are able to discern 
a creature (a monkey perhaps or a devil) riding on someone’s back, whereas in the back-
ground a dark monster looms whose greedy hands overshadow the entire scene. Behind 
the sage on the left, we read the passionate appeal, Seid einig, einig! (“Be united, unit-
ed!”), whereas the sage on the right seems to be discussing Geldnot (“shortness of money”). 
The greedy claws are inscribed, from left to right, Zwietracht (“discord”), Neid (“jealousy”), 
Missgunst (“ill will”), and Wucher (“usury”). Beneath the scene, a verse comments on the 
gloomy picture:
70 My interpretation of the imagery draws on Gerke, Das Geld der mageren Jahre, 162–65.
71 See ibid., 134–37.
Die Tage tanzen in rasender Flucht 
Wir sind vom Teufel besessen 
Und Ordnung und Sitte und Treue und Zucht 
Vergessen sind sie, vergessen.
“The days are dancing in frenzied flight 
We are possessed by the devil 
And order and custom and loyalty and discipline 
Forgotten are they, forgotten.”
These lines are a quotation from a well-known poem that Paul Warncke (1866–1933) 
contributed under the title Vergessen (“Forgotten”) to the nationalist magazine Kladdera-
datsch. The poem’s final line—not quoted here, but surely on everyone’s mind—left no 
doubt about who was to blame for all the misery: Und was der Feind uns angetan, das sei ihm 
nicht vergessen! (“And what the enemy has inflicted upon us, that shall not be forgotten!”).
Finally, in the frame surrounding the obverse of our banknote, we find some fig-
ures that serve to illustrate the pace of the inflation. For example, the line at the bottom 
explains that the cost of living increased by a startling 3,045,000,000% between 1914 and 
October 23, 1923.
The obverse of the Bielefeld banknote situates the hyperinflation of the Weimar Re-
public in the context of a social discord that has reached diabolic proportions. The artist be-
moans the lack of unity (Seid einig, einig!) within Germany, but he ultimately suggests that 
the war is to be blamed for the tragedy that has befallen the German people. The reverse of 
the 100 billion banknote (adapted from a 5000 mark banknote issued in February, 1923) re-
peats this theme at its very top edge.71 Thus, the user is reminded of Deutschlands Zusam-
menbruch 11. Nov. 1918, “Germany’s collapse, November 11, 1918,” the date on which Germany 
signed the armistice with the Allied forces. In densely printed text right under this headline, 
the artist—a certain Schreiber—has compiled a list of war expenditures by the Allies in the 
year 1922, followed by price comparisons that illustrate the extent of the inflation (for exam-
ple, “1918: 1 hat, 8 marks; 1923: 1 hat, 30,000 marks”).
The scene beneath this text is utter chaos. The crown and scepter of the Reich have 
fallen, as have the German eagle and the country’s maritime prestige (Seegeltung). A judge 
on the right vainly shouts, Seid einig, einig, einig while a valiant worker attempts to hold 
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the pillars of the country together, but uni-
ty (Einheit), order (Ordnung), the unity of 
the Reich (Reichseinheit), and law (Recht) 
cannot be salvaged as they tumble about 
violently. At the very bottom, cowed or 
even dead, we find, on the right, a soldier 
and, on the left (with book and owl), an 
intellectual (Geistesarbeiter). On the for-
mer, a line from Schiller’s Wilhelm Tell 
comments, Ein Grab der Freiheit ist’s, “it’s 
a grave for freedom.” Above the intellec-
tual this verse is inscribed: Wir wissen den 
Weg in jene Welt, wo die stärkste Maschine 
in Schutt zerfällt (“we know the path into 
the kind of world where the strongest ma-
chine falls into ruin”).72
In light of Simmel’s claim regarding both the “quasi-religious faith” that the function-
ing of the money economy requires, and the similar roles that God and money play in the se-
quence of purposes, the religious references on the reverse of our banknote are particularly re-
vealing. An inattentive observer could miss the crosses on the crown and the scepter, crosses 
which subtly suggest that, with the monarchical rule of the Kaiser, the Christian faith itself 
has been brought down. Upon closer inspection, the falling pillars—marked “revolution” and 
“civil society” (bürgerliche Gesellschaft), respectively—bear religious inscriptions. Starting on 
the left, we read, “golden calf ” (goldenes Kalb), with a reference to Psalm 73:12: “Behold these 
are sinners; and yet abounding in the world they have obtained riches.”73 The pillar devoted 
to civil society bears a reference to Psalm 109:24: “My knees are weakened through fasting: 
and my flesh is changed for oil.” Finally, the pillar on the extreme right cites Psalm 79:4: “We 
are become a reproach to our neighbors: a scorn and derision to them that are round about 
us.” Furthermore, the pillar on the left not only says, “golden calf,” but is topped by a small im-
age of a calf or bull, the ultimate signifier of idolatry from the narrative of Exodus 32. This is a 
society that has abandoned its faith in the true God and, as a consequence, has plunged into 
chaos. People trample on each other without respect for social order and justice. At the top, 
we now encounter shady figures such as the Schieber (the black marketer or racketeer).
The one-dollar banknote from figure 3, with its motto, “In God We Trust” and the 
serene imagery from the Great Seal of the United States—especially the pyramid with the 
eye of providence at its top—contrasts starkly with the 100 billion marks from Bielefeld. 
The contrast throws into relief the truth of Simmel’s claim that money requires a quasi-re-
ligious trust in the social order. Without such trust, the social order and the money that 
represents it collapse.
72 I have been unable to identify the source of this verse.
73 The Psalms are quoted from the Douay-Rheims version.
Figure 5: Reverse of the 100 billion banknote depicted in 
figure 1.  (From the author’s collection.)
